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We suggest a political economy explanation for the stylized fact that intragenerationally more 
redistributive social security systems are smaller. Our key insight is that linking benefits to 
past earnings (less redistributiveness) reduces the efficiency cost of social security (due to 
endogenous labor supply). This encourages voters who benefit from social security to support 
higher contribution rates in political equilibrium. We test our theory with a numerical analysis 
of eight European countries. Our simple, but suggestive median voter model performs 
relatively well in explaining the stylized fact and cross-country differences in social security 
contribution rates. 
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Old-age pensions are at the core of public sector in almost all OECD countries. In 2001, the 15
EU member states spent on average 8.8 percent of their GDP on public old-age pensions (OECD,
2004). But while united in ﬁscal importance, pension systems are divided in how beneﬁts
are linked to past earnings. In earnings-related (“Bismarckian”) public pension programs,
pensions are perceived as a form of postponed wage income, intended to replace earnings during
retirement. Such beneﬁt rules dominate in Continental Europe, including France, Germany and
Italy. In the competing tradition of rather ﬂat-rate (“Beveridgean”) pensions, the stated aim of
old-age beneﬁts is to guarantee a reasonable standard of living for the elderly, and beneﬁts are
correspondingly ﬂat-rate or close to it. Countries with close to ﬂat-rate pensions include Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.1 Since contributions are typically proportional
to earnings, in ﬂat-rate beneﬁt formulas the pension system implies a higher intragenerational
redistribution than in earnings-related systems.
Countries with earnings-related public pension programs have considerably higher contribu-
tion rates than those with ﬂat-rate beneﬁts. Disney (2004) reports that the eﬀective contribution
rates in the 10 OECD countries dominated by ﬂat-rate systems varied between 14,7 percent
in Australia and 23,7 percent in the United Kingdom in 1995. The range in the 12 OECD
countries with more earnings-related beneﬁts was between 22,4 percent in Germany and 57,7
percent in Greece. The average eﬀective contribution rate was 19 percent in countries with
ﬂat-rate beneﬁts, and 35 percent in countries with earnings-related beneﬁts.2
In this paper, we ask whether a median voter model is able to explain the positive correlation
between the size of the social security system and the degree to which pension beneﬁts depend on
past contributions. We ﬁrst present a theoretical model where citizens vote on the social security
contribution rate and then decide on their labor supply. In our model, citizens diﬀer in two
dimensions, age and productivity. There are three cohorts, the young, the middle-aged and the
old, and ﬁve productivity classes within each cohort. As contributions towards earnings-related
beneﬁts cause smaller labor supply distortions, the eﬃciency cost of social security ﬁnancing is
lower than with ﬂat-rate beneﬁts. However, low productivity voters weigh the eﬃciency eﬀect
1In most countries, social security has both a ﬂat-rate and an earnings-related component, the relative
importance of which diﬀers. We choose labels for countries according to which component is more pronounced,
taking our classiﬁcation from Disney (2004) who labels earnings-related systems Bismarckian and ﬂat-rate
systems Beveridgean.
2In 2001, public spending on old-age beneﬁts was in average 6,4 percent of GDP in countries with ﬂat-rate
beneﬁts, and 9,4 percent in countries with earnings-related beneﬁts (Disney, 2004; OECD, 2004).
2against the reduction in intragenerational redistribution and a more earnings-related system
may not be preferred by this group of voters. Thus, the model predicts that the correlation
between the size of social security and the degree to which pensions are earnings-related depends
on the identity of the politically-decisive voter.
In a second step we analyze whether our median voter model with endogenous labor supply
is able to explain cross-country diﬀerences in social security contribution rates, when accounting
for diﬀerences in their pension formula (earnings-related versus ﬂat-rate). To do so, we perform
a numerical analysis that delivers the values of the equilibrium social security contribution
rates of our model for Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom. For these countries, we use information on the income distribution taken from
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) survey from the year 1997. In each country,
we form three age groups: the young (aged between 21 and 40 years old), the middle-aged
(aged between 41 and 60 years old), and the old (aged between 61 and 80 years old). We divide
each cohort into ﬁve income-groups of equal size and calculate the relative productivity of the
diﬀerent groups for each country (based on the ECHP survey). Data on the earnings-related
component of the pension transfer is taken from Conde Ruiz and Profeta (2004).
As the voting incentives crucially depend on expectations concerning future productivity
growth and demographic development we consider two alternative scenarios. In the ﬁrst sce-
nario, we assume that citizens vote as if the current dependency ratio would reﬂect steady-state
demographic development. For the second scenario, the data on the projected population
growth rate are taken from the United Nations and refer to the situation in 2020. For each sce-
nario, we estimate the contribution rate preferred by the median voter with alternative values
of interest rate, productivity growth and elasticity of labor supply.
Studying two alternative scenarios is informative in two respects. First of all, it reveals
how sensitive the predictions of the median voter model are to changes in various parameters.
Second, it allows us to calculate to what extent diﬀerent assumptions concerning the behavior
of voters are able to explain cross-country diﬀerences in labor supply. Provided that the median
voter model is a reasonable approximation of how contribution rates are politically determined,
the diﬀerent scenarios shed light on the set of expectations that voters appear to use when voting
on social security. Our numerical analysis shows that, when applied to diﬀerent countries, our
model correctly predicts that in both scenarios countries with more earnings-related public
pension programs have higher contribution rates than those with more ﬂat-rate beneﬁts. This
3relationship is strongest in the ﬁrst scenario. The pro social security coalition is found not to
be too dependent on low productivity voters. The reduced labor supply distortion in a more
earnings-related system uncontestedly increases demand for social security, thereby providing
an explanation for the empirical observation that less redistributive social security systems
entail a higher contribution rate.
Previous contributions have addressed various economic and political implications of dif-
ferences in the pension formulae. Jensen et al. (2004) computationally analyze the eﬃciency
and redistributive eﬀects of diﬀerent social security rules with endogenous labor supply and
human capital formation, taking the size of the social security system as given. The political
economy literature, on the other hand, has mainly focused on explaining the aggregate size of
social security (proxied by the contribution rate). Beneﬁts are usually assumed to be either per-
fectly ﬂat-rate or earnings-related (see Galasso and Profeta (2002), Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) for surveys and the seminal contributions by Browning (1975), Boadway and Wildasin
(1989), Cooley and Soares (1999), Tabellini (2000) and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000)). An
explanation for the stylized fact which relies on borrowing constraints has been proposed by
Casamatta et al. (2000a).3 Although the median voters’ income is below average income, the
preferred contribution rate may increase when the social security system redistributes less.4 A
discontinuity in the model’s prediction arises for suﬃciently earnings-related systems in which
case the political equilibrium contribution rate drops to zero.
Our motivation for testing the role of labor supply distortions in explaining the correlation
derives from the observation that in particular young, low-productivity individuals face bor-
rowing constraints.5 Analyses of voting behavior suggest that the politically decisive voter is
advanced in age and not necessarily of low-income (e.g. Cooley and Soares, 1999 and Sinn
and Uebelmesser, 2002) - a household type for which borrowing constraints play a diminished
role. Thus, in our paper capital markets are perfect and, to capture the role of age for voting
behavior more thoroughly, individuals work for two periods. The latter diﬀerence allows even
3Casamatta et al. (2000b) analyze the eﬀect of Bismarckian parameter on social insurance, but not on
PAYG-ﬁnanced old-age security. In their model income redistribution takes place inside each generation.
4The result is sensitive to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If it is below unity, a positive correlation
between the size and type of social security may arise. For values above unity, the model’s prediction of a negative
correlation contrasts the empirical observation.
5Casamatta et al. (2000a) allow social security to distort economic decision captured by a quadratic eﬃciency
term. The extension does not undo the impact of capital markets imperfections on voting incentives.
4high-productivity individuals to support social security. When close to retirement, they view
past contributions as sunk and prefer a continuation of social security (Cooley and Soares, 1999
and Boldrin and Rustichini, 2000).
Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2004) analyze simultaneous voting on the type of social security
system and on its size. In their model, a smaller ﬂat-rate system is supported by a voting
coalition of low-income individuals, who are in favor of a redistributive system, and high-
income individuals, who are in favor of a redistributive system provided that the social security
contribution rate is smaller, so that they can invest their resources in the private capital market,
where they can earn higher returns. A large earnings-related system instead is supported by the
middle-income individuals. Diﬀerent to our paper, Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2004) take labor
supply to be exogenous. We provide a diﬀerent explanation for a positive relation between
the degree of intragenerational redistribution and the size of the social security system. We
show that labor supply distortions are suﬃcient to generate this positive relationship even with
uni-dimensional voting. As a consequence, our explanation applies also to countries where the
type of social security (earnings-related or ﬂat-rate) has been historically given.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model. Section 3




Individuals diﬀer in two dimensions: age and productivity. In each period there are three
overlapping generations: young, middle-aged and old. Each generation works for two periods, 1
and 2, and is retired in period 3. Individuals of each cohort diﬀer in their productivity. We index
the productivity types so that the productivity is increasing in the index number, the lowest
productivity being denoted by one. While our theoretical framework holds with any number J
of productivity types, we restrict the number of productivity classes to ﬁve in each age group in
the numerical part of the paper. The induced productivity is allowed to vary over the life-cycle.
The productivity of a j-type individual, being young in period t is denoted as a
y
j,t > 0.T h e
productivity of a j-type individual who is middle-aged in period t is analogously denoted as
am






j+1,t∀j. All productivity parameters grow
5at the rate g. The number of workers being of a j type born in period t is n
j
t, with the total




t = nt. For simplicity, the proportion of each








nt+1∀j,t.T h ec o h o r t
size evolves according to nt+1 =( 1+η)nt.










Consumption for a j-type individual born in period t is
c
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j,t) denotes working hours by a j-type individual being young (middle-aged) in period t






j,t). Without loss of generality the wage rate each




j,t, is normalized to unity. In
the ﬁrst period of life an individual of j-type derives utility from private consumption c
y
j,t which













, and private savings s
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j,t.6 τt and τw are the social security contribution rate and




j,t+1, respectively. An analogous structure applies to the second period of
life. Individuals of type j born in period t retire in period t +2 . Old age consumption, co
j,t+2,
is ﬁnanced out of pension payments, pj,t+2, and private savings, (1 + r)sm
j,t+1 where r denotes
the interest rate. There are no bequests.
Product and factor markets are perfectly competitive and market prices are exogenous for
the economy. The ﬁxity of prices may follow from a linear production technology or in a small
open economy from factor price equalization in the presence of goods traded.7
6Modelling the disutility from labor supply as a reduction in instantaneous consumption is common in
analyses of welfare programs, see e.g. Diamond (1998), Saez (2002) and Cremer and Pestieau (2003). An
important implication of this modelling choice is that all income eﬀects are shifted onto consumption demand.
7In this way, intergenerational linkages are exclusively formed by the unfunded social security system.
62.2 Social security system
We analyze a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system. Thus, total pension payments in



















The individual pension payment in period t+2consists of a ﬂat-rate and an earnings-related
component:
pj,t+2 = pt+2 + bj,t+2. (5)
In the earnings-related component, the beneﬁt bj,t+2 is indexed to wage income in period


















t+2 denote how income as young and middle-aged translate into pension claims




t+2, allowing income earned as young and middle-aged to be treated diﬀerently in the pension




t+2 are zero in pure ﬂat-rate system (θ =0 ) and are largest
(ceteris paribus) in a pure earnings-related system (θ =1 ).
Residually determined, the ﬂat-rate component pt+2 is






















s.t. (1) to (3), (5), and (6).




j,t+1, (see Appendix 2)
8Notice that individuals pay a unique social security tax rate (not two, one for the earnings-related part and




































Labor supply is down-ward distorted by the general wage tax τw. The negative impact of the





Our model allows optimal labor supply to vary over the life-cycle and over productivity types
of the same age-cohort. For analytical simplicity, we formulate social security rules and utility
functions so that labor supply behavior is uniform over the life-cycle and across productivity






























The cost of labor supply linearly depends on the individuals’ productivity which captures
the idea that high income households face a higher opportunity cost of labor supply. Weighting
the marginal costs and beneﬁts of supplying one additional hour of labor, the inﬂuence of the
individual productivity on labor supply is immaterial.9 (A1) only gives a uniform intra-cohort
labor supply as x
y
t+2 and xm
t+2 may take diﬀerent values.





t+i(1 + r), ∀i ∈ N.( A 2 )
The individual becomes indiﬀerent between contributing one unit of income to the earnings-
related pension system as young or as middle-aged. (A2) in combination with (A1) imply that
labor supply behavior is uniform over the life-cycle.10
To clarify the implications of both assumptions note that the uniformity only applies to
working time. Labor supply in eﬃciency units is heterogeneous for diﬀerent productivity types
of the same cohort and over the life-cycle if individual productivity changes over time. The
simplifying formulation is ﬂexible enough to capture a positive correlation between wage income
and productivity in each working period and allows for an upward-sloping age-earnings proﬁle.
Individual preferences for social security are thus heterogeneous along both the productivity
and age dimension.
9See (17) and (18) in Appendix 2.
10See (17) and (18) in Appendix 2.
8The implications of social security for labor supply incentives follow from Lemma 1 and 2:




t+i = θτtχ(1 + r) and θxm
t+i = θτtχ,
where the factor χ is independent of τt.
χ measures the ratio of total wage income out of which pension beneﬁts are ﬁnanced in t+2
over the aggregate life-cycle income of the contributor of the same age-cohort discounted to the
second period of life t +1 .I f θχ > 0, contributors ex-ante realize that their future pension
payment will be a fraction θχ of their discounted lifetime wage income, multiplied by the social
security contribution rate. The anticipated link will be stronger, the larger the earnings-related
part of the social security system is (as measured by θ). In a pure earnings-related system
(θ =1 ) pensioners will receive a positive rate of return on their past contribution equal to χ−1
while in a pure ﬂat rate system (θ =0 ) pensioners will anticipate a zero rate of return.
In what follows we consider the case of a dynamically-eﬃcient economy. Lemma 2 reports
the implications for the rate of return on social security contributions.
Lemma 2 In a dynamically eﬃcient economy, χ is lower than 1+r.T h u s ,θχ − 1 <rfor
θ ∈ [0,1].
Using Lemma 1, (A1), (A2) and (8), individual labor supply in each working period is
d l(τt)=v0−1
∙






























∂ (1 − τw − τt)
< 0. (11)








∂(1−τw−τt).T h eﬁrst term in Eq. (10) reports
the negative labor supply response to the contribution hike due to a lower wage income in the
period in which labor is supplied. The second term gives the positive supply response since a
9higher contribution increases pension income at a rate
θχ
1+r. Implied by Lemma 2 labor supply
decreases on net for any θ ∈ [0,1]. The labor supply distortion is highest in a pure ﬂat-rate














1 − τw − τt
 <0 , (12)




g l(τt) > 0. The labor supply elasticity with respect to the contri-
bution rate is inﬂuenced by the fraction of the contribution rate which is considered a wage
tax, 1 −
θχ
1+r, and the labor supply elasticity with respect to the net wage rate 1 − τw − τt.11
3 Political Equilibrium
As voters, citizens not only evaluate the impact of social security on their individual labor
supply, but also evaluate how aggregate labor supply and the PAYG budget is aﬀected by a
change in the contribution rate. Voting over the contribution rate takes place given the type
of the social security system measured by θ.12 In order to focus on issues arising in voting on
social security we take τw as given. Citizens decide upon the social security contribution rate
by a once-and-for-all voting. Appendix 3 shows how the identiﬁed political equilibrium can also
be sustained in a repeated voting setting by resorting to a suitable trigger strategy.



















s.t. (1) to (3), (4), (9) and (17) to (19).
Variables with abdenote the optimal consumer choices derived from the household optimiza-
tion problem analyzed in the last section. Young voters compare the costs arising from social
security contributions, made as young and middle-aged, to the beneﬁts they receive as old.
Similarly, a j-type voter middle-aged in period t maximizes remaining life-time utility:
11Recall, the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor supply is normalized at unity.
12Similar to Casamatta et al. (2000a), the voting game is one-dimensional, since we assume that the type of



















s.t. (2) to (3), (4), (9) and (18) to (19).
For the middle-aged, contributions made when young are sunk. They just compare the cost
arising from social security contributions, made as middle-aged, to the beneﬁts they receive as
old.
For any θ ∈ [0,1],t h eb e n e ﬁt each pensioner receives is increasing in the social security bud-
get. The elderly thus uniformly maximize utility by voting for the contribution rate argmaxPt.
Preferences are single-peaked which renders the median voter politically decisive with a
majority voting on the contribution rate.
We proceed by ﬁrst characterizing voting incentives in the polar social security systems
(θ =1and θ =0 ) and consider a mixed system (θ ∈ (0,1))a f t e r w a r d s .
3.1 Earnings-related social security system
Proposition 1 characterizes voting incentives in period t in the presence of a pure earnings-
related social security system (θ =1 ).
Proposition 1 (i) In an earnings-related social security system young voters prefer a zero
contribution rate whereas middle-aged voters prefer a positive contribution rate if the increase
in productivity over the life-cycle, measured by am
j,t/a
y
j,t−1, is not too pronounced. Pensioners
prefer a strictly positive contribution rate independently of the income history.
(ii) The contribution rate preferred by each middle-aged voter (if it is positive) and the
pensioners is decreasing in   and τw. Moreover, the contribution rate most preferred by each
middle-aged productivity group (if it is positive) is decreasing in the ratio of their second period’s




Young voters prefer a zero contribution rate. The rationale is that an earnings-related
pension system implicitly taxes contributions at a rate 1 −
χ
1+r > 0 in a dynamically eﬃcient
economy - see Lemma 2. The young would prefer to eliminate the implicit tax burden by voting
for a zero contribution rate. If the continuation beneﬁt outweighs the implicit taxation of the
second period’s contribution, the middle-aged of type j will vote for a positive contribution
rate. These ﬁndings recoup the predictions in Browning (1975).
11Voting incentives diﬀer over the life-cycle but are nearly homogeneous within each age
cohort. While voting incentives of the young cohort and the elderly are perfectly aligned across
cohort members the preferred contribution rate of the middle-aged electorate is negatively




the preferred contribution rate is unrelated to the productivity type and may be largest for high-
productivity individuals. They may thus favor the highest contribution rate (if it is positive)
among all middle-aged voters.13 If voters prefer a continuation of social security, the preferred
contribution rate is decreasing in   and τw as both add to the eﬃciency cost of social security
ﬁnance.
The identity of the median voter depends on the population distribution along the age and
productivity dimension. If, as assumed in the paper, the productivity distribution within each
age cohort is constant over time and population growth is moderate in the sense that the young
generation cannot form a majority of voters, the political equilibrium may entail a continuation
of the social security system although it is an unfavorable savings technology when viewed over
the whole life-cycle.
3.2 Flat-rate social security system
Proposition 2 characterizes voting incentives in a pure ﬂat-rate social security system. In what
follows a
y
t−1 denotes the weighted average productivity of the young in period t − 1.
Proposition 2 (i) In a pure ﬂat-rate social security system the most preferred contribution
rate is weakly increasing in age for all productivity types. For voters of the same age cohort
the preferred contribution rate is weakly decreasing in the productivity type. Pensioners prefer
a strictly positive contribution rate independently of the income history.
(ii) If a voter’s preferred contribution rate is strictly positive, it is decreasing in   and τw.
Moreover, the contribution rate most preferred by each middle-aged productivity group (if it is





Young, low-productivity voters do not necessarily opt for a positive contribution rate al-
though they beneﬁt from intragenerational redistribution inherent in a ﬂat-rate pension sys-
13Two period analyses of social security (one working period and one period of retirement) ﬁnd voting incen-
tives to be aligned over productivity types in an earnings-related system - see e.g. Casamatta et al. (2000a).
With more than one working period this result may not hold as middle-aged voters may well face diﬀerent




12tem. They do so only if their productivity relative to the weighted average productivity of the
members of the same cohort is suﬃciently low. The result is reminiscent of Tabellini (2000).






t+1) thus strictly prefers a
zero contribution rate while young. Low productivity voters only prefer a positive contribution
rate if their life-time productivity is suﬃciently low. The share of young voters who support a
positive contribution rate depends on the skewness of the productivity distribution, supporters
being a subset of those whose lifetime expected income is below the average of their cohort.
Since the ﬁrst-period contribution is sunk, middle-aged voters evaluate the beneﬁt against
the contribution as middle-aged. The preferred level of social security is weakly higher than
the level preferred by the young of the same productivity type.
Independently of age and productivity a voter’s demand for social security is decreasing in
the labor supply elasticity   and the general wage tax τw. Both magnify the distortion in the
labor supply margin following an incremental rise in τt.
The identity of the median voter depends on how the population is distributed in the age and
productivity dimension. The elderly are joined ﬁrst by the middle-aged with lowest productivity,
a n ds u b s e q u e n t l yb yg r o u p sw i t ht h el o w e s tr e maining discounted lifetime net income.
3.3 Mixed social security system
In a mixed social security system (θ ∈ (0,1)) voting incentives are a combination of those under
the polar social security systems. The next proposition gives a more detailed characterization
of how voting incentives are inﬂuenced by the degree of intragenerational redistribution.
Proposition 3 (i) For any given θ ∈ (0,1), the preferred contribution rate of all young and
middle-aged voters is weakly decreasing in their productivity type,   and τt.
(ii) The young and middle-aged voters’ preferred contribution rate may be non-monotonic in
θ ∈ (0,1) provided it is positive. The pensioners’ preferred contribution rate is strictly increasing
in θ ∈ (0,1).
As with the polar cases of θ =0and θ =1 , voters who are still part of the workforce
have heterogeneous preferences with respect to the social security contribution rate. On the
one hand, the labor supply distortion arising from social security is decreasing in θ. The lower
eﬃciency cost of running the social security system pushes voters to support a larger social
13security system. On the other hand, a lower degree of intragenerational redistribution reduces
the distributional gains that in the ﬁrst place young low-productivity voters derive from social
security. Provided that the median voter is middle-aged and does not have a very low income,
the net eﬀect can be expected to be that a higher θ results in a higher social security contribution
rate, an intuition that our numerical analysis in the following section conﬁrms.
4 A Numerical Analysis
In this section we numerically compute the political-equilibrium social security contribution
rates of the model presented above. The purpose is to relate the simulated contribution rate to
the parameters of the model, in particular to the link between individual income and pension
claims, θ, and the labor supply elasticity, ε. Thereby, we provide insight into the relation
between the pension beneﬁt formula (earnings-related versus ﬂat-rate) and the size of the
social security budget (proxied by the contribution rate) and the extent to which the correlation
is shaped by cross-country diﬀerences in labor supply distortions brought about by diﬀerent
pension formulae.
We focus on a sample of European countries. Restricted by data availability, the sample
includes: Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.14
Each country’s population is decomposed into three age groups and ﬁve income groups. For
each of these countries, we numerically solve for the social security contribution rate preferred
by each individual in each age and income group and subsequently identify the median voter.
Formally, we solve the “political” ﬁrst order condition that determines the optimal choice of
τ for each individual in each age and income group, applying country-speciﬁc values for the
exogenous variables (ε,r,θ,η,g,τw).15
We simulate the equilibrium social security contribution rate under two diﬀerent scenarios:
in the ﬁrst scenario we use current data for population and productivity growth rate in each
country, and in the second scenario we use projections for the population and productivity
growth rates (see table 1). In scenario 1 parameter values are inferred from past performance
during the last period of 20 years, while in the second scenario country-speciﬁc parameter values
14The data are taken from the European Commission Household Panel (ECHP). From the ECHP sample we
exclude Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands because we do not have all necessary information and
Luxembourg, Finland, and Sweden because we have too few observations.
15The “political” ﬁrst-order conditions are depicted in Appendix 2. In particular, (24) relates to the young
voter, (26) relates to the middle-aged voter and (27) gives the ﬁrst-order condition for the elderly.
14are inferred from United Nations (UN) and EU projections for development during the following
period of 20 years from the year 2000 onwards.
4.1 The Data
We consider three age-groups: young (aged between 21 and 40 years), middle-aged (aged be-
tween 41 and 60 years), old (aged between 61 and 80 years), and ﬁve income-groups of equal
size (very-low income, low-income, middle-income, high-income, very-high income). Consider-
ing groups of equal size represents a “neutral” criterion to divide the population in the same
way in ﬁve income groups in all countries.
For the ﬁrst scenario, the data on the current population growth rate are taken from the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), wave 1997.16 We calculate the number of
individuals in each of the three age groups, and obtain the dependency ratio, deﬁned as the
ratio between the number of old individuals and the sum of young and middle-aged individuals.
Calling ξ the growth rate of population over one period, consisting of 20 years, the dependency
ratio is equal to: 1/[(1+ξ)(2+ξ)], from which we can implicitly derive the value of ξ. Calling
η the annual population growth rate and given that (1 + η)20 =( 1+ξ), we derive the value of
η shown in table 1. For the second scenario, the data on the projected population growth rate
are taken from the United Nations and refer to the year 2020 - see table 1.
From the ECHP data set, we obtain data on productivity (wage earnings divided by the
number of hours worked) for each worker (young and middle-aged). For these two age groups,
we divide individuals in 5 income groups of equal size and calculate the average productivity
in each income group. We then calculate the overall average productivity for all young and
middle-aged. By dividing the average productivity in each income/age group by the overall
average productivity, we ﬁnd the “productivity matrix” for each country, as shown in table 2.
Rows correspond to age groups (young, middle-aged) and columns to income groups (very-low
income, low-income, middle-income, high-income, very-high income).
Data on g, the growth rate of average productivity, are obtained from EUROSTAT. Scenario
1 considers the average growth rate of per capita productivity in the period 1990-2003 and
scenario 2 the projected growth rate of productivity from 2003 to 2020 - see table 1 for the
data.
Data on the tax rate on income without social security τw (see table 3) are taken from
16For a detailed description of the ECHP data see Peracchi (2002) and Nicoletti and Peracchi (2001).
15OECD Taxing Wages (2000) and refer to the average tax rate for a single person with no
children earning average income.
Data on θ, the earnings-related component of the pension system, are derived from Conde
Ruiz and Profeta (2004), who also used the ECHP data on wages and public pensions. The
Bismarckian index is the correlation index between the level of post-retirement pension beneﬁt
and pre-retirement earnings and shown in table 3. Pension beneﬁts include only public pensions.
Theoretically, in a pure ﬂat-rate system the correlation is zero and unity in an earnings-related
system.17 Occupational pension systems constitute the second pillar of old-age security whose
ﬁnancial importance signiﬁcantly varies across countries. All ﬁrm-based systems are run on
a funded basis (Fenge et al., 2003) and in our setting are equivalent to private savings. The
Bismarckian index thus need not, and should not, include occupational pensions.
The simulations are obtained for diﬀerent values of the elasticity of labor supply to net
income ε. From Pencavel (1986) and Immervoll et al. (2004), we take [0.3,1] as the plausible
range of labor supply elasticities.18
Finally, in table 4 we report the real value of the eﬀective contribution rates to public
pension programs in each country, calculated by Disney (2004).19
4.2 The Results
We ﬁrst report the preferred contribution rate for individuals of all income and age groups
(ﬁfteen groups). Older individuals are in favor of sustaining the social security system and vote
for the contribution rate which maximizes social security revenues. For middle-aged individuals,
the preferred level of the contribution rate decreases with income. The theoretical ambiguity
found in propositions 1( ii) and 2( ii) (which generalizes to a mixed system) is resolved in
favor of a negative relation between productivity type and the level of contributions preferred
by middle-aged voters. The same ordering applies to young individuals; yet in many cases, all
young people prefer a zero contribution rate, except when intra-cohort redistribution is high
17Data on replacement rates for varying income groups (ﬁgure 3 in Disney, 2004) provide a congruent picture
of the redistributiveness of social security (for the countries covered by both analyses). Also, qualitative clas-
siﬁcations presented in Disney (2004) and Fenge and Werding (2003) are in line with the adopted quantitative
measure of redistributiveness.
18These estimates refer to the overall elasticity, i.e. to the intensive (working hours) and the extensive
(labor force participation) margin. Although we formally resort to one-dimensional labor supply behavior (only
intensive labor supply), the use of the overall estimate is helpful in capturing all budgetary implications of social
security related labor supply distortions.
19As in our model, Disney considers the contribution rate which balances the social security budget, i.e.
without resorting to external ﬁnancing via general taxation.
16(for instance in the UK, a ﬂat-rate system), in which case the low and very low-income young
individuals choose a positive contribution rate. This result is in line to what we obtained in
propositions 1( i), 2( i),a n d3( i). In a pure earnings-related system, all young would vote for
a zero contribution rate, while in a mixed system this is certainly true at least for high-income
young individuals.
Our numerical simulations deliver a matrix of preferred tax rates by age and income group.
We aggregate preferences through majority voting, by identifying the median voter and his
preferred tax rate. The results for the two scenarios are in tables 5 and 6.
Given our values of the growth rate of population, young individuals are never in the ma-
jority. If the young always choose the lowest tax rate among all groups, the median voter is a
middle-aged individual. Depending on the growth rate of the population, the group to which the
median voter belongs ranges from the low-income middle-aged (in case of a very low η), to the
very high-income middle-aged (in case of a very high η). In the scenario 1 of our simulations,
the median voter is always a high-income middle-aged individual, except in Italy and Germany
where he is a very-high income middle-aged. In scenario 2, where the population growth rates
are almost the same in all countries, the median voter is always a middle-income middle-aged,
except in the United Kingdom, where he is a poor middle-aged.
The economic variables play the expected role in determining the equilibrium level of the
social security contribution rate, and therefore the size of the PAYG budget-balanced social
security system. A general result in the social security literature (Galasso and Profeta, 2002)
is that a higher growth rate of productivity g, higher growth rate of population η and lower
interest rate r increase the equilibrium social security contribution rate. Our results conﬁrm
these relations. When perturbating the population growth rate η two eﬀects shape the political
equilibrium. First, a lower population growth rate may change the identity of the median voter.
The decisive group typically switches from a very high-income (or high-income) middle-aged
individual to a middle-income middle-aged individual, who would choose a higher contribu-
tion rate. Second, the working generations’ labor supply response w.r.t. τ becomes stronger,
provided that θ>0. This lowers contribution rates preferred by all those voting for positive
contribution rates. The overall eﬀect is thus ambiguous, as it is evident by comparing scenario 1
and 2. We also obtain a negative relation between the general wage tax τw and the equilibrium
contribution rate τ (as in propositions 1( ii), 2( ii) and 3(i)).
The new results that we obtain in this paper concern the role of the labor supply elasticity,
17ε, and the role of the earnings-related component of the pension system θ. We can summarize
these results as follows:
• Elasticity of labor supply ε: The preferred contribution rate decreases with the elasticity
of labor supply. When labor supply is more elastic, the distortionary eﬀect of the pension
system is larger and the preferred contribution rate is lower.
• Earnings-related component of the pension beneﬁt θ: The results show a positive associa-
tion between the earnings-related component of the pension system and the contribution
rate.
The simulation reveals a positive correlation between the earnings-related component and
the equilibrium social security contribution rate. The contribution rate chosen by high-income
individuals is most likely increasing in θ. Reduced redistribution makes social security more
attractive to high-income middle-aged individuals, at the same time as it reduces its eﬃciency
costs. High-income individuals are the group of the median voter in scenario 1, but not in
scenario 2. This at least partly explains why the correlation between the earnings-related
component and the social security contribution rate is stronger in the ﬁrst scenario.
The correlation between θ and τ is reported in tables 5 and 6 for all scenarios. Two diﬀerent
eﬀects arise: the ﬁrst one relates to the distortion of labor supply, which is larger in a more
ﬂat-rate system, thus leading to the positive relation between θ and τ.I ft h em e d i a nv o t e rd o e s
not change across countries (for instance, he is always a very rich middle-aged individual), this
would be the unique eﬀect and the positive relation would be guaranteed. The second opposite
eﬀect is that the identity of the median voter changes, because ﬂat-rate beneﬁts y s t e m sp r o v i d e
more income redistribution from rich to poor (contributions are proportional to earnings and
beneﬁts are ﬂat), and thus the median voter tends to belong to a group with lower lifetime
earnings in earnings-related systems. A poorer median voter chooses a larger size of the social
security system. The overall result shows that the ﬁrst eﬀect generally prevails and we observe
a positive relation between the size of the social security system (measured by τ)a n dt h e
earnings-related component (θ).
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between our simulated social security contribution rate (τ)
and the earnings-related component (θ)i nt h eﬁrst scenario for three diﬀerent values of the
elasticity of labor supply. Social security systems which redistribute less across income groups
are larger. This result conﬁrms that our model provides an explanation for why countries where
18the pension beneﬁts are more earnings-related are associated with larger pension expenditures.
This relation is weaker under scenario 2, as illustrated by ﬁgure 2, showing that diﬀerences in
population and productivity growth rate across countries play a relevant role.
In tables 5 and 6 we also report the correlations between our simulated contribution rates
and the real (eﬀective) contribution rates calculated by Disney (2004). An obvious question
arises: how close are our estimations to the real values?20 The last lines of tables 5 and 6
show that our model performs quite well in explaining the real contribution rates. In the ﬁrst
scenario, the correlations between real values (see table 2) and our estimated values range from
0.427 (when   =0 .5 and r =0 .045)t o0.721 (when   =0 .3 and r =0 .035), while in the
second scenario they range from 0.507 (when   =1and r =0 .04)t o0.590 (when   =0 .5 and
r =0 .035). These values conﬁrm that in all speciﬁcations our model is able to a certain extent
to explain the real values and the cross-country diﬀerences in social security contribution rates.
Tables 7 and 8 report the results of a sensitivity analysis. We aim at isolating the role of
θ in explaining the real values of social security contribution rates from the role of the other
economic and population characteristics. In table 7 we report the estimated values for the
social security contribution rate, when θ is set equal to 0.5 for all countries and the other
parameters (g,η,τw, the productivity levels) have the same values as in scenario 1. For all
speciﬁcations of r and ε, the correlations between the real and the estimated contribution rates
are now smaller than when cross-country diﬀerences in θ were taken into account (table 5).
This means that θ plays an independent role in explaining the real values and the cross-country
diﬀerences in social security contribution rates, independent from the economic characteristics
of the countries. However, when all countries are assumed equal with respect to economic
characteristics (as in table 8, where for all countries we set a common value for g,η,τw and the
productivity levels, which is equal to the average of the country-values), and countries diﬀer
only by θ, the correlation between real and estimated values increases in two cases (r =0 .045
and   =0 .3, r =0 .045 and   =0 .5) and decreases in the other ones. This result suggests that
also the economic characteristics play an important role in explaining the level of the social
security contribution rates in each country, independently of θ. Table 8 also shows that when
θ is the only variable that diﬀerentiates the countries, the positive relation between θ and the
social security contribution rate is very high (correlations close to 1). This last result arises from
20Notice that our numerical analysis does not aim at predicting the real values of the social security contri-
bution rates. Rather, it aims at reproducing a stylized fact that social security systems which link beneﬁts to
past contributions are in average larger, as well as providing an explanation of this.
19the critical role labor supply distortions have in accounting for the positive relation between θ
and τ. It is maximum when all other diﬀerences across countries are neglected.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Among European OECD countries, the average eﬀective contribution rate in 1995 was 19 per-
cent in countries with ﬂat-rate beneﬁts, and 35 percent in countries with earnings-related bene-
ﬁts (Disney 2004). The relationship between the level to which beneﬁts depend on past earnings
and social security contribution rate has received little attention in the political economy litera-
ture, despite its robustness. In this paper, we suggest an explanation based on endogenous labor
supply. The eﬃciency cost of redistributing income is lower when beneﬁts are earnings-related,
encouraging voters who beneﬁt from social security to support higher contribution rates. Low
income voters weigh this eﬀect against the reduced redistributiveness of more earnings-related
systems. Our numerical analysis of several European countries suggests that the standard me-
dian voter model is able to explain the stylized fact that intragenerationally more redistributive
social security systems are smaller.
The social security contribution rates predicted by the median voter model also have a strong
correlation with the eﬀective rates calculated by Disney (2004). This means that our median
voter model is able at least in part to explain the levels of contribution tax rates and their
cross-country diﬀerences. We ﬁnd that the correlations between our estimated contribution
rates and the eﬀective contribution rates are quite high under both scenarios considered. Even
though our analysis focuses on steady-state political equilibria, our main result that beneﬁt
formula signiﬁcantly aﬀects political equilibrium contribution rates can be expected to hold
also outside of steady-states. This suggests that the political response to population aging may
crucially depend on to what extent beneﬁts are linked to past contributions.21 Accounting for
these dynamic responses is left for future research.
21Existing literature on social security voting under population aging includes Cremer and Pestieau 2000,
Casamatta et al. 2001, Galasso 2002, and Sinn and Uebelmesser 2002.
206 Appendix 1: Structure of the earnings-related social
security system
Af r a c t i o nθ
y and θ
m of the pension budget in period t +2which is spent on earnings-related
pensions, θPt+2, is allocated to meet pensioners’ claims generated as young and middle-aged,
respectively. Given by assumption (A2) the parameters θ
y and θ
m are such that, in equilibrium,
the implicit tax imposed by the social security system is the same for income earned as young































Budget-balancing is guaranteed by the fact that θ
y and θ
m sum up to unity - see (15).
The ﬁrst budget component θ






y(1 + η)t(1 + g)t d l(τt),
where x
y
t+2 is endogenously determined so as to balance the budget.





m(1 + η)t(1 + g)t d l(τt),
where xm
t+2 adjusts to balance the budget.
7A p p e n d i x 2
7.1 Derivation of (8) and (9)

















s.t. Eqs. (1) to (3), (5), and (6).
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(1 + r)=0 . (19)




j,t+1) -s e e( 8 ) .
Inserting assumptions (A1) and (A2) into (17) - (19) and using Lemma 1, optimal labor
supply reduces to (9).
7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
θ





y(1 + η)t(1 + g)t d l(τt).
where the left-hand side depicts the pension budget in period t +2which is spent on pension
claims generated when being young and the right-hand side gives the respective pension claims.











y(1 + η)t+2(1 + g)t+2 d l(τt)+λ
m(1 + η)t+1(1 + g)t+1 d l(τt)
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λ
y(1 + η)t(1 + g)t d l(τt)
= τt(1 + r)
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y(1 + η)2(1 + g)2 + λ









m(1 + η)t(1 + g)t d l(τt).










y(1 + η)t+2(1 + g)t+2 d l(τt)+λ
m(1 + η)t+1(1 + g)t+1 d l(τt)
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y(1 + η)2(1 + g)2 + λ
m(1 + η)(1 + g)
λ
m +( 1+r)λ







t+2 = θτtχ(1 + r) (21)
θxm
t+2 = θτtχ. (22)
7.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Inserting the expression for χ - see (20) - in the inequality χ − 1 <rand rearranging gives
(1 + η)2(1 + g)2λ
y +( 1+η)(1 + g)λ
m < (1 + r)2λ
y +( 1+r)λ
m.
If the economy is dynamically eﬃcient, (1 + η)(1 + g) < 1+r, the inequality holds.
7.4 Proof of Propositions 1 - 3
In proving Propositions 1 - 3 we ﬁrst derive the young and middle-aged voter’s ﬁrst-order
condition for the general case of θ ∈ [0,1] . Subsequently we analyze the voting incentives for
the polar social security systems θ =0and θ =1f o l l o w e db yt h em i x e ds y s t e mθ ∈ (0,1).
For τt+i = τt∀i ∈ N (once-and-for-all voting), the tax rate preferred by a young, j-type













































d l(τt)+τt d l(τt)
0´
,
w h e r ew eh a v em a d eu s eo ft h ea u x i l i a r yv a r i a b l e
ωt+2 = λ
y(1 + η)t+2(1 + g)t+2 + λ
m(1 + η)t+1(1 + g)t+1. (23)








































































































Analogously, for τt+i = τt∀i ∈ N (once-and-for-all voting), the tax rate preferred by a j-type
voter, who is middle-aged in period t, follows from diﬀerentiating (14) subject to (2) to (3), (4),
and (9). In doing so we get
−am


























d l(τt)+τt d l(τt)
0´
,
where the auxiliary variable ωt+1is
ωt+1 = λ
y(1 + η)t+1(1 + g)t+1 + λ
m(1 + η)t(1 + g)t. (25)























































































































1 − τw − τt
 
!
ωt =0 . (27)




















which is negative in a dynamically eﬃcient economy - see Lemma 2.





















The second term is strictly positive which indicates that the middle-aged voter prefers a
strictly positive contribution rate if the second term dominates the ﬁrst term. Observe this
occurs less likely the higher am
j,t/a
y
j,t−1 (divide (29) by a
y
j,t−1), the higher  , and the higher τw.






1 − τw − τt
 
!
ωt =0 . (30)
Comparing with (29) the preferred contribution rate is strictly larger than the contribution
rate preferred by any j-type middle-aged voter.
(ii): If the contribution rate most preferred by the middle-aged voter is positive, i.e. (29) is
equal to 0,i ti sd e c r e a s i n gi n , τw, and am
j,t/a
y
j,t−1. Given by (30) the contribution rate most
preferred by the elderly is decreasing in   and τw.






























































t+1) denotes the weighted (by productivity shares) average productivity of the
young (middle-aged) workers in period t (t+1). With dynamic eﬃciency (1+r>(1 + η)(1+g))
the preferred contribution rate is weakly decreasing in the voter’s productivity type for any
  > 0.














































Again,with dynamic eﬃciency (1+r>(1 + η)(1+g)) the preferred contribution rate is
weakly decreasing in the voter’s productivity type for any   > 0. Comparing (32) and (34)
reveals that for each productivity type the preferred contribution rate is weakly increasing in
age due to the ﬁrst-period contribution being sunk as middle-aged.




1 − τw − τt
 
¶
ωt =0 . (35)
which is strictly larger than the contribution rate preferred by any young and middle-aged
voter.
(ii): Given by (31), (33), and (35), each voter’s preferred contribution rate is weakly de-




j,t (divide (34) by am
j,t).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 (i) Making use of the deﬁnition of ωt+2 (23) and the assumption


































































































A young or middle-aged voter is more likely to prefer a positive contribution rate the







t+1). For each productivity type, a voter when middle-aged prefers a weakly higher
contribution rate than when being young which reﬂects the sunk cost character of the ﬁrst
period contribution.
Note, for young and middle-aged voters the preferred contribution rate is weakly decreasing
in   and τt.
(ii)L e tτ
y
j,t denote the tax rate preferred by a young, j-type voter in period t (analogously,
τm
j,t denotes the contribution rate preferred by a middle-aged, j-type voter in period t). Provided
τ
y
j,t > 0, diﬀerentiating (36), which is set equal to 0, w.r.t. τ
y



































Dy is the second derivative of the young voter’s objective function w.r.t. the contribution
rate which is negative at an interior optimum. Analogously, provided τm
j,t > 0, diﬀerentiating
(37), which is set equal to 0, w.r.t. τm












































Dm is the second derivative of the middle-aged voter’s objective function w.r.t. the contri-
bution rate which is negative at an interior optimum.
A priori the responses can be positive or negative, as well as ﬂuctuating in sign over θ ∈ (0,1).
27Lastly, given by (27) the contribution rate most preferred by the old is strictly increasing
in θ.
8A p p e n d i x 3
This appendix shows how the results that we d e r i v e dw h e nv o t i n gw i t hc o m m i t m e n tc a nb e
generalized to voting without commitment.
Agents vote according to a stationary subgame perfect strategy proﬁle. A strategy for an
individual is a mapping from the history of the voting outcomes to the wage tax rate τt that
the individual votes for, and is subject to τt ∈ [0,1].L e tsk
t be the voting strategy proﬁle over
τt of all individuals belonging to generation k in period t.H e r e k can be either y (young),
m (middle-aged) or o (old). Denote the ﬁrst period when the game is played and when the
equilibrium strategy may be established by 0. The history of the game at period t, ht,r e p o r t s
τt chosen in all previous periods starting from t =0 : ht = {τ0,τ1,...,τt−2,τt−1} when t>0.
The set of all possible past outcomes at time t is denoted by Ht.D e ﬁne





t=0 is a stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium, if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) s is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
(ii) At every period t, the equilibrium outcome associated with s is an equilibrium of the
static game with commitment.
(iii) In any period and for any history, ht ∈ Ht, the sequence of equilibrium outcomes
induced by s is constant.
Cooley and Soares (1999) assume a trigger strategy, specifying that the voting outcome
converges to a complete abolition of the social security system in the case of the result in
one period diﬀering from the subgame perfect equilibrium with a once-and-for-all voting. In
their example, voters make a binary choice on whether to maintain social security. In our
framework with continuous choice, a threat strategy specifying that any deviation is punished
by abolition of social security would not always maintain the subgame perfect equilibrium,
resulting from voting with commitment, when there is instead repeated voting. The reason for
this is that the high-productivity young citizens might ﬁnd it optimal to deviate. When voting
28with commitment, they would prefer a lower social security contribution rate than the median
voter. By voting for a higher social security contribution rate than the median voter, they would
change the identity of the median voter. In this way, they would cause an upward deviation,
triggering an elimination of social security. If the continuation value of social security would be
negative for them also in the second period, then such a deviation would be optimal for them.
In a similar way, a problem of deliberate deviations in the ﬁrst period of life to undermine the
equilibrium do not arise in Kotlikoﬀ et al. (1988) and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) as they
model only two overlapping generations.
Poutvaara (2004) speciﬁes a trigger strategy which allows the outcome of voting with com-
mitment to be maintained also with repeated voting with three overlapping generations, intra-
generational heterogeneity, and voting on two issues. The following deﬁnition and proof are
simpliﬁcations to voting with one issue. Deﬁne
Deﬁnition 2 In the implicit intergenerational contract voting strategy (IICVS) related to an
equilibrium b τ,ac i t i z e ni, who prefers τi
t when voting with commitment, votes for this social
security contribution rate in period t =0 , as well as in period t>0, provided that the history for
the previous periods satisﬁes τj ≥ b τ ∀j ∈ {0,1,...,t − 1}. If these conditions are not satisﬁed,
the citizen votes for the τt he or she preferred in period t, assuming that the (other) young and
middle-aged citizens no longer vote for a positive social security contribution rate due to the
collapse of the implicit intergenerational contract. The individual-speciﬁcs u p e r s c r i p ti captures
both age and productivity.
IICVS states that any other deviation from the intergenerational contract except for a devia-
tion to a higher social security contribution rate leads to the break-down of the intergenerational
contract. If voting in some period would produce a higher social security contribution rate than
in the equilibrium, then the IICVS speciﬁes that this does not violate the contract. Neither
does it give a reason for changing the τ speciﬁed by the contract. Intuitively, working gener-
ations are not punished by an abolition of future social security beneﬁts if their voting would
lead them to pay higher social security beneﬁts than speciﬁed by the contract. This strategy
supports the equilibrium with once-and-for-all voting also with repeated voting:
29Proposition 4 Any equilibrium which would exist when voting with commitment can be main-
tained also in repeated voting as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
Assume that b τ is an equilibrium with voting with commitment. It is suﬃcient to prove that
with IICVS, the citizens either do not want to deviate or if they would like to deviate, then
their deviation does not change the outcome of the voting in a way that would result in the
collapse of the intergenerational contract. The elderly have clearly no interest in deviating from
voting for the τ which would maximize their current social security beneﬁts. Neither do the
middle-aged have any incentive to deviate from the τ they would prefer with commitment. A
deviation downward in the social security contribution rate would only result in them losing
their social security beneﬁts in the following period. The young who beneﬁtf r o ms o c i a ls e c u r i t y ,
on the other hand, already vote for the τ that would maximize their lifetime utility, so they
have no incentive to deviate. The young citizens who would prefer a lower social security
contribution rate than arising as political equilibrium are already voting for a lower social
security contribution rate than the median voter, so that any deviation downward by them
would not aﬀect the outcome of the voting. The only way in which the young who prefer a
lower social security contribution rate than that preferred by the median voter can change the
outcome of voting is by voting for a higher rate. By the deﬁnition of IICVS, a deviation upward
would not cause the abolition of social security. Therefore, the young who would like to have a
lower social security contribution rate cannot gain anything by deviating from voting for their
preferred rate with voting with commitment. The threat point of the voting equilibrium (0)
following a punishable deviation is also a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium. If the young and
the middle-aged expect that social security beneﬁts will not be maintained in future, they have
no interest in maintaining them after a deviation. The old would still vote for τ>0,b u tt h e y
are in minority.
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Table 1: Data on productivity and population growth rates 
   Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
  Country  η  (%)  g (%)  η %)   g (%) 
Austria 1.30 2.10  -0.79 1.80
France 1.39 2.00  0.07 1.80
Germany 1.76 1.60  0.00 1.80
Greece 0.52 3.00  -0.53 3.00
Italy 1.62 1.80  -0.56 1.80
Portugal 0.78 2.50  -0.59 3.00
Spain 0.91 3.00  0.15 1.80
UK 2.04 1.80  0.60 1.60
Source: η : author’s calculations from European Commission Household Panel (scenario 1) and 
from United Nations (scenario 2).  g:  from EUROSTAT.  
 
Table 2. Data on productivity levels 











Young 0.422  0.703  0.859  1.0149  1.377 
Middle-aged 0.613  0.88  1.0834  1.396  1.883 
France 
Young 0.354  0.622  0.768  0.999  1.451 
Middle-aged 0.539  0.783  1.023  1.364  2.098 
Germany 
Young 0.375  0.736  0.895  1.076  1.456 
Middle-aged 0.579  0.848  1.019  1.262  1.858 
Greece 
Young 0.338  0.617  0.777  1.021  1.514 
Middle-aged 0.397  0.793  1.13  1.446  2.129 
Italy 
Young 0.407  0.705  0.862  1.031  1.341 
Middle-aged 0.616  0.9207 1.133  1.353  1.774 
Portugal 
Young 0.346  0.564  0.704  0.907  1.797 
Middle-aged 0.411  0.677  0.891  1.284  2.727 
Spain 
Young 0.249  0.554  1.509  0.945  1.573 
Middle-aged 0.485  0.839  1.145  1.571  2.371 
UK 
Young 0.257  0.715  0.905  1.164  1.725 
Middle-aged 0.213  0.765  1.003  1.272  2.037 
 
 Table 3: Other data 
  Country  θ   w τ  
Austria 0.52  0.098 
France 0.65  0.134 
Germany 0.55  0.215 
Greece 0.73  0.022 
Italy 0.55  0.193 
Portugal 0.80  0.067 
Spain 0.70  0.121 
United Kingdom  0.26  0.158 
Source: θ taken from Conde Ruiz and Profeta (2004).  w τ : OECD Taxing Wages 2000 (tax rate on 





Table 4: Effective contribution rate 









Corr ) , ( eff τ θ   0.57
Source: Disney (2004) 
 
 
 Table 5: Results. Scenario 1 
Scenario 1 
  r = 0.045  r = 0.035   
    ε =0.3  ε =0.5  ε =1  ε =0.3  ε =0.5  ε =1   
 Country   θ   τ   τ    τ    τ   τ   τ   median voter 
Austria      0.52 0.42 0.32 0.2 0.56 0.46 0.32 middle-aged,  high-income
France    0.65 0.54 0.45 0.32 0.65 0.58 0.45 middle-aged, high-income 
Germany    0.55 0.43 0.35 0.23 0.54 0.46 0.34 middle-aged, very high-income 
Greece    0.73 0.51 0.43 0.4 0.76 0.69 0.58 middle-aged,  high-income 
Italy    0.55 0.43 0.35 0.23 0.55 0.47 0.35 middle-aged, very high-income 
Portugal    0.8 0.56 0.52 0.38 0.73 0.69 0.59 middle-aged, high-income 
Spain      0.7 0.61 0.53 0.4 0.75 0.71 0.62 middle-aged,  high-income
UK      0.26 0.32 0.3 0.2 0.48 0.4 0.3 middle-aged,  high-income
corr(θ , τ ) 
  
0.907 0.851 0.844 0.897 0.888 0.847    
corr(τ ,  eff τ )  0.488    0.427 0.657 0.721 0.676 0.662
 
 Table 6: Results. Scenario 2 
Scenario 2 
  r = 0.04  r  = 0.035   
    ε  = 0.4  ε  = 0.5  ε  = 1  ε  = 0.3  ε  = 0.5  ε  = 1   
 Country  θ   τ   τ   τ   τ   τ   τ   median voter 
Austria    0.52 0.44 0.36 0.27 0.49 0.39 0.26 middle-aged, middle-income 
France    0.65 0.39 0.35 0.23 0.51 0.41 0.28 middle-aged, middle-income 
Germany    0.55 0.31 0.27 0.17 0.42 0.33 0.22 middle-aged, middle-income 
Greece      0.73 0.55 0.5 0.36 0.68 0.59 0.44 middle-aged,  middle-income
Italy    0.55 0.24 0.21 0.12 0.38 0.29 0.19 middle-aged, middle-income 
Portugal      0.8 0.59 0.55 0.41 0.71 0.6 0.5 middle-aged,  middle-income
Spain      0.7 0.53 0.44 0.3 0.56 0.47 0.34 middle-aged,  middle-income
UK    0.26 0.35 0.32 0.2 0.46 0.36 0.23 middle-aged,  poor 
corr (θ ,τ ) 
  
0.667 0.667 0.670 0.705 0.718 0.753    
corr (τ , eff τ )  0.543    0.512 0.507 0.553 0.590 0.547Table 7: Sensitivity analysis (1) 
   Sensitivity analysis (1) 
r = 0.045  r = 0.035    
ε  = 0.3  ε  = 0.5  ε  = 1  ε  = 0.3  ε  = 0.5  ε  = 1 
Country 
eff τ   τ   τ   τ   τ   τ   τ  
Austria    0.348  0.49 0.397 0.265 0.606 0.516 0,379
France 0.277  0.48 0.382 0.255 0.582  0.495 0.364
Germany    0.224  0.41 0.304 0.196 0.506 0.425 0.306
Greece 0.577  0.51 0.404 0.265 0.646  0.548 0.399
Italy      0.4 0.41 0.32 0.207 0.52 0.44 0.319
Portugal    0.354  0.49 0.395 0.261 0.615 0.52 0.378
Spain 0.45  0.51 0.412 0.28 0.62  0.538 0.406
UK      0.237 0.5 0.405 0.278 0.6 0.52 0.396
corr(τ ,  eff τ )  0.387 0.363 0.286 0.554 0.521 0.434
θ =0.5 for all countries. g and η  from scenario 1. productivity levels from table 2.  w τ  from table 3.  eff τ  from table 4. 
  
Table 8: Sensitivity analysis (2) 
   Sensitivity analysis (2) 
r  =  0.045  r  = 0.035   
 
ε  = 0.3  ε  = 0.5  ε  = 1  ε  = 0.3  ε  = 0.5  ε  = 1 
Country 
eff τ   τ   τ   τ   τ   τ   τ  
Austria    0.348  0.524 0.429 0.297 0.618 0.536 0.406
France 0.277  0.567 0.478 0.345 0.675  0.605 0.484
Germany    0.224  0.534 0.44 0.307 0.63 0.55 0.421
Greece 0.577  0.595 0.51 0.378 0.715  0.656 0.547
Italy      0.4 0.534 0.44 0.307 0.63 0.55 0.421
Portugal    0.354  0.622 0.54 0.412 0.755 0.707 0.615
Spain    0.45  0.585 0.498 0.366 0.699 0.636 0.522
UK      0.237 0.47 0.342 0.24 0.569 0.474 0.33
corr (θ ,τ )  0.987 0.998 0.98 0.961 0.9607 0.957
corr(τ , eff τ )  0.574 0.574 0.569 0.564 0.565 0.557
θ from table 3. η , g,  w τ , and the productivity levels are set for all countries equal to the the average of the country levels. 
eff τ  from table 4.  
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